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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore in a specific hospital care process the applicability
in practice of the theories of quality costing and value chains.
Design/methodology/approach – In a retrospective case study an in-depth evaluation of the use of
a quality cost model (QCM) and the applicability of Porter’s care delivery value chain (CDVC) was
performed in a specific care process: glaucoma care over the period 2001 to 2006 in the Rotterdam Eye
Hospital in The Netherlands.
Findings – The case study shows a reduction of costs per product by increasing the number of
outpatient visits and surgery combined with a higher patient satisfaction. Reduction of costs of
non-compliance by using the QCM is small, due to the absence of (external) financial incentives for
both the hospital and individual physicians. For CDVC to be supportive to an integrated quality and
cost management the notion “patient value” needs far more specification as mutually agreed on by the
stakeholders involved and related reimbursement needs to depend on realised outcomes.
Research limitations/implications – The case study just focused on one specific care process in
one hospital. To determine effects in other areas of health care, it is important to study the use and
applicability of the QCM and the CDVC in other care processes and settings.
Originality/value – QCM and a CDVC can be useful tools for hospital management to manage the
outcomes on both quality and costs, but impact is dependent on the incentives in the context of the
existing organisational and reimbursement system and asks for an agreed on operationalisation
among the various stakeholders of the notion of patient value.
Keywords Quality costs, Value chain, Health services, Eyes, The Netherlands
Paper type Case study
Introduction
Hospital management requires managing both medical and financial performance
(Crosby, 1979, 1983; Rivers and Tsai, 2001; Walburg, 2003; Brinkman, 2006). Usually in
Dutch hospitals, physicians are focussed on medical results, while the hospital
administration is primarily interested in the financial outcomes (RVZ, 1999). According
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to the law, the hospital board is responsible for the overall quality delivered by the
hospital (Ministerie van Volsgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 1996).
Methods and data used to manage and improve quality are different to the methods
and data used for cost control (Custers et al., 2001, 2004; Revere and Black, 2003; Van
den Heuvel et al., 2006). These different approaches and the resulting inconsistencies in
performance management cause serious problems in health care (IOM, 2000, 2001).
Based on the statement that investments on quality are necessary before realising
returns, Custers et al. (2001) developed a quality cost model (QCM) to match quality
and cost information for both policy and decision making in hospitals. To facilitate the
choice between potential quality projects, the cost of the projects (prevention,
assessment) were compared with the potential gains (reduced costs of non compliance).
Evaluation of the use of QCM in five health care institutions demonstrated its general
applicability but broad use was limited by facts related to hospital culture and the
prevailing reimbursement structure in 2001 based on hospital budget (van Ineveld et al.,
2002; Custers et al., 2004). In 2005 a new reimbursement structure for hospital care was
introduced. Based on the system of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), the Dutch
government developed its own specific system called Diagnose Behandel
Combinaties(DBCs (diagnosis treatment combination)). These DBCs differ from
DRGs as they include all the costs of both outpatient and inpatients costs and the fees
for the specialist services. The DBCs reflect all the hospital (absorption) costs involved
with all the necessary activities executed for the patient from first contact to discharge.
This also means that costs of housing, depreciation, finance, etcetera, are part of a DBC.
Although the financing via DBCs is subject to overall budget agreements, since 2005
the Dutch Government allows that on average 10 per cent of the production of a
hospital is subject to free negotiations between health care insurers and hospitals on
price and quantity per DBC. The Government expects quality to become an integral
part of these negotiations. These in 2005 chosen DBCs are mostly related to
non-complex hospital care. The remaining production is still part of a fixed budget
scheme. From 2008 onwards an increasing number of DBCs will be chosen to become
part of free negotiations and thus of more competitive forces (Schut and Van de Ven,
2005; Schreyo¨gg et al., 2006).
Porter and Teisberg (2006) postulated to reduce the tension between quality and
costs by introducing the notion of “patient value” (see also Porter, 1985; Nolan and
Berwick, 2006). In their much quoted book they proposed a care delivery value chain
(CDVC) in which the focus should be on the added value for the patient and each (part)
product or service in the whole process. They identified eight principles for a health
care system to be able to compete on value:
(1) focus on value for patients, not just on lowering costs;
(2) competition based on results;
(3) competition focussed on medical conditions over the full cycle of care;
(4) high quality care should be less costly;
(5) value must be driven by provider experience, scale and learning at the level of
the medical care process;
(6) competition should be regional and national, not just local;
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(7) data on results should support value-based competition and must be widely
available; and
(8) innovations that increase value must be strongly rewarded.
To study the use of the QCM and the CDVC in practice, we have applied the two
approaches on a concrete care delivery process: glaucoma care in the Rotterdam Eye
Hospital, over a period of five years. We used the methodology described by Yin (2003) to
evaluate our experiences. This methodology is advisable when the boundaries between
the evaluated phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident and one has to cope
with a situation in which there are many more variables of interest then data points. We
have focused in our single, longitudinal case study on the following research questions:
RQ1. How did the organisation of the glaucoma care process develop between 2001
and 2006?
RQ2. What are the results of using a QCM and what is the relation to the CDVC?
RQ3. In which way does the new reimbursement system influence the quality
costing behaviour of the hospital management?
Given the changing conditions in the reimbursement structure in 2005, we analyzed the
use of the QCM and the applicability of the CDVC over the period 2001 to 2006. The
unit of analysis is one specific care process in one specific hospital, the Rotterdam Eye
Hospital. We have focused on glaucoma care delivery, because patient groups may be
easily identified, treatment paths are obvious and the main routing of the patients is
known. The case hospital (30 ophthalmologists, 350 employees) had its first
experiences with the use of QCM for another care process, cataract surgery in the late
1990s (Bandel et al., 1997, 1999).
Glaucoma is a group of eye diseases and one of the most common causes of blindness
worldwide (Quigley and Broman, 2006). It affects the optic nerve that connects the eye to
the brain and requires life-long treatment. It can be treated, but not cured, and
approximately 1-2 per cent of the (Western) general population has it (NEI, 1998; Kymes
et al., 2006). Some more detailed characteristics of glaucoma are given below.
What is glaucoma?
Glaucoma is a group of eye diseases and one of the commonest causes of irreversible
blindness worldwide. Approximately 1 or 2 per cent of the general population has it
(Western world), but only half of all patients are aware of it (Quigley, 1996, Quigley and
Broman, 2006). Without treatment it typically worsens slowly. Treatment may slow or
stop the worsening.
Management of glaucoma requires many tests, e.g. visual fields, optic nerve
examinations, eye pressure management and eye exam and is time consuming. Efficient
management will save time, money and notably unnecessary blindness/suffering.
In the US, glaucoma is responsible for 7 million patient visits to the ophthalmologist
and an annual financial burden on society (health expenditure and loss of income) was
estimated to be US$1.5 billion in 1998 (NEI, 1998). Direct medical costs of American
glaucoma patients have been recently estimated to be US$ 2.9 billion (PBA, 2007). The
increased (double) aging of society will increase the need for glaucoma care over the
next decades.
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Methods
To obtain data to answer the research questions the following methods were applied:
. A multidisciplinary group of physicians, nurses and research employees twice
created a flow chart of the glaucoma care process (in 2001 and in 2006). From
these findings, and from formal changes in organisation of glaucoma care, a
description of the developments in the organisation of the glaucoma care process
over a period of five years is provided.
. Based on these flow charts, quality indicators were constructed for the different
parts of the process. These indicators were based on literature, on clinical
experience in the group, on measurability, on consequences for the patient and on
critical position in total care delivery. For each quality indicator, a standard score
was specified and costs were calculated. Potential costs of non-compliance were
calculated. By means of patient records, patient satisfaction surveys and cost
calculations, a zero level measure (2001) and two effect measures (2002 and 2006)
were determined. The number of respondents by measurement instrument were
as shown in Table I.
We have used the statistical package “SPSS Inc. 15.0 for Windows” to analyze
the data of the patient satisfaction surveys and patient records. Descriptive
statistics were used to obtain frequencies and means for the different indicators.
. A literature and document search was done to gain up-to-date knowledge on
relations between reimbursement and quality cost management. We used the
databases PubMed/Medline, Cochrane Library, Emerald, Web of Knowledge and
Web of Science and searched on: quality, costs, value chain, failure costs, cost of
non-compliance, indicators, business case, reimbursement. For further
understanding of the Dutch situation management letters, policy statements
and (annual) reports from the case hospital and national stakeholders were used.
The acquired insights were compared with the situation in our case study.
To increase the construct validity, an expert group and key informants have
reviewed the different drafts of the case study reports. They have confirmed the
identified items that will be described in the results section. Data triangulation
was used when comparing data gathered by the financial department with data
generated by the involved medical department. For the same reason, those who
have been the subjects of the case study (physicians, nurses, management) have
reviewed and commented on the research outcomes.
Results
RQ1: glaucoma care delivery process: design and developments
The overall glaucoma care delivery process in the case hospital has been drawn in
Figure 1.
Measurement instrument
2001
(t ¼ 0)
2002
(t ¼ 1)
2006
(t ¼ 2)
Patient satisfaction survey 85 41 155
Patient records 73 30 78
Table I.
Number of respondents
by measurement
instrument and time
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Figure 1.
Flow chart of glaucoma
care process in the case
hospital
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The overall process of 2001 contains 57 different steps. The flow chart is similar to the
one of 2006, although it contains important differences in the flow of stable glaucoma
patients.
Developments in glaucoma care delivery
The analysis of the developments in glaucoma care in the case hospital showed
important changes in the demand for care, innovation and organisational structure. In
Figure 2, the developments in these areas are shown in their mutual relationship. We
have drawn this framework to analyze the order and intensity of actions of the
different developments and stake holders. Below, the different areas shown in Figure 2,
will be discussed in more detail. Next, we comment on the different paths of the
framework.
Developments in the demand for care. The number of outpatient visits increased
with almost 40 per cent, from 6.879 patients in 2001 to 11.015 patients in 2006 (see
Figure 3). The number of ophthalmologists for glaucoma is still the same (four).
The number of surgical procedures (trabeculectomy, Baerveldt implants) remained
much the same, while the number of peripheral iridectomies (YAG-laser) and laser
trabeculoplasties (LTPs) increased. In the outpatient department (OPD), the increasing
number of visits at a fixed capacity overburdened the system. In 2002, restrictions on
appointments for new patients were therefore introduced to regulate the flow. By
shared care measures (see section “Shared care” below), the number of outpatient visits
(first and follow-up visits) since 2004 increased.
Innovation and technology. Since 2002, a new imaging technology for the
examination of the optic nerve has been used: the GDx VCC (Carl Zeiss Meditec, Inc.,
Dublin, California, USA), which measures the thickness of the optic nerve tissue. This
may assist clinicians to make the diagnosis of glaucoma and also to monitor the
disease (Reus, 2005). If carefully instructed, paramedics, such as technicians and
optometrists, may also use the GDx VCC.
Shared care. The GDx VCC might also be used by optometrists in commercial optic
dispensaries. In 1993, a collaborative project was started between optometrists in
primary care and the, tertiary care, case hospital. Optometrists took pictures with the
GDx VCC and sent the images via a protected online connection to the hospital. This
yielded the detection of many previously undetected cases of glaucoma. These were
seen and treated by the case hospital’s glaucoma specialists. Referring stable glaucoma
patients to the participating optic dispensaries for glaucoma monitoring however,
failed. The dual substitution of tasks compared to usual care, i.e. follow-up by
paramedics instead of by ophthalmologists, as well as follow-up outside the hospital
instead of within, appeared to contribute largely to this failure (de Mul et al., 2004, 2007;
Verhoef et al., 2004). Therefore, as well as because of the increasing burden at the OPD,
a shared-care project within the hospital was started in 2004. This entailed establishing
a so-called glaucoma shared care unit (Stevens et al., 2002; Blanco et al., 2007). Stable
glaucoma patients visit this unit for follow-up visits twice at regular intervals, followed
by a visit to the glaucoma ophthalmologist after the same interval. This led to a
substantial increase in the number of visits both at the glaucoma shared care unit and
the glaucoma OPD. As a result of this shared care, glaucoma specialists could focus on
more difficult care delivery.
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Figure 2.
Developments in
glaucoma care delivery in
the case hospital,
2001-2006
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Organisational structure. From the perspective of organisational structure, a decrease
in hierarchy levels occurred. In 2001, the organisation of the case hospital was
determined by medical function. Many departments (perimetry, OPD) each with their
own hierarchical heads, played a role in glaucoma care delivery. In the studied period,
the focus changed to redesigning (clinical) treatment teams. In 2006, one hierarchical
head per treatment team still existed. The organisational redesign was focussed on a
more simple hierarchical structure per treatment team.
RQ2: use of a QCM and a CDVC
The integration of quality management and cost management is not a new issue for
trade and industry. The most traditional models are the prevention appraisal failure
costs (PAF) model designed by Feigenbaum (1956) and Masser (1957) and the process
cost model (PCM) designed by Crosby (1979, 1983).
PAF. Investments in prevent and assessment could result in a decrease of costs of
non-compliance. The model shows that a maximum quality level is not an economic
option. Based on this model, perfect quality from economic perspective is never
reachable. Maximum quality asks an endless investment in prevention with a result
that is not profitable anymore. There is no evidence for this hypothesis (Diepman, 1996;
Dale and Plunkett, 1995). The model also neglects the changing importance of quality.
The more customers request quality, the more the strategic focus needs to be on
prevention activities. Taking these statements into account, PAF is useful in
prioritising improvements, but based on the ideas of total quality management (TQM)
it is important to focus on the costs of each process instead of random defined quality
costs. Based on these failures a process cost model was developed.
PCM. The PCM identifies all activities within the process, based on flow charts. The
question of added value should be answered for each activity. Activities without added
value can be eliminated. The costs of quality (COQ) are the sum of the cost of
conformance (COC) and the costs of non-conformance (CONC), so COQ ¼
COC þ CONC (Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996).
Both the PAF and the PCM model share a restriction: they do not compare the
necessary expenses and the obtained results. Health providers however, do prefer more
insight in the necessary actions (costs) and the related effects (gains) of quality care in
order to allocate the resources in an efficient way.
Figure 3.
Developments in (first
time) visits at outpatient
department (OPD),
Glaucoma Shared Care
Unit and surgery in case
hospital, 2001-2006
Creating patient
value
239
Six Sigma. Another way of relating optimising processes to reducing costs is Six
Sigma. This method is developed and widely used in industry and nowadays also
experiences in health care (Van den Heuvel et al. 2004, 2006). Starting with identifying
“critical to quality” characteristics, Six Sigma tries to tackle quality outcomes in five
phases: define, measure, analyse, improve and control. It is also strongly oriented on
organisational structure: a lot of project leaders (called Black Belts or Green Belts) are
trained in project management, problem-solving methodology and statistical methods.
For a hospital organisation, however, it is a question if it is stimulating for medical
professionals to get involved into the details of strict managerial methods.
Business case for quality. Next to the earlier initiatives, there is a call for developing
business cases for quality initiatives (Reiter et al., 2007). Starting with describing the
intervention and determining the case perspective, the effects on quality, cash flows are
calculated. Up to now, research reports about the use of business cases mostly describe
case studies (Leatherman et al., 2003; Luck et al., 2007; Manna et al., 2006).
QCM
To define, measure and evaluate quality and cost outcomes in the case study, we used a
QCM developed by Custers et al. (2001) (see Figure 4). The model integrates quality
management and financial management, based on the advantages of PAF and PCM
and with use of the principles of business case experiences. The consequences of poor
quality and quality improvement on the bottom line of an organisation are made
visible by QCM. By translating poor quality into costs of non-compliance and therefore
the potential gain of corresponding savings highlights the importance of an
improvement initiative from a managerial perspective and allows prioritising
improvement initiatives on an economic argument. The costs of quality improvements
can be set against the gains (benefits) of (potential) savings. The related cost benefit
ratio’s can be used to rank different quality improvements in order of importance. By
comparing the realised and the potential costs and gains, monitoring becomes possible.
Within this perspective, quality improvement initiatives are treated as investments in
the sustainability of a health care organisation.
The care process that is linked to a certain category of patients (e.g. DBC) forms the
centre of the QCM. The model starts with defining the care process, identifying the
“critical success factors” based on what is medically important and the goals and
strategy of the organisation and the formulation of the indicators (steps A to B).
Subsequently, the costs of non-compliance are calculated (step C). These costs of
non-compliance represent the total costs to an organisation resulting from the failure to
achieve quality. Per indicator, the costs of non-compliance can be calculated in terms of
“repair activities” or “loss of income”.
Next, the costs of non-compliance are compared to the standard (D). The steps E and
F will lead to a prioritisation of the improvement initiatives. This includes an analysis
of the underlying reasons for poor performance, the development of solutions and the
implementation costs of these solutions. In step G the cost benefit ratio of each project
will be calculated and based on this, the available resources and the scope of impact on
the organisation a decision will be made on which improvement initiatives will be
implemented. Table II shows the quality indicators that are used in the quality and cost
study in the case hospital. The indicators and norms are primarily based on the
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Figure 4.
Quality cost model (QCM)
Creating patient
value
241
20
01
sc
or
e
20
02
sc
or
e
R
C
S
20
06
sc
or
e
R
C
S
R
C
S
P
C
S
N
or
m
t
¼
0
C
N
/n
C
N
t
¼
1
(t
¼
1)
t
¼
2
(t
¼
2)
(t
¼
1
þ
2)
(t
¼
1
þ
2)
In
d
ic
at
or
(%
)
(%
)
(e
)
(e
)
(%
)
(e
)
(%
)
(e
)
(e
)
(e
)
M
ed
ic
al
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
1
T
ar
g
et
p
re
ss
u
re
(T
P
)
is
n
ot
ed
in
p
at
ie
n
t
m
ed
ic
al
re
co
rd
7
0
5
1
9,
91
11
.8
63
5
8
1.
69
5
5
6
1.
30
7
3.
00
2
8.
86
1
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
2
P
at
ie
n
ts
g
et
a
fl
y
er
at
th
e
ou
tp
at
ie
n
t
d
ep
ar
tm
en
t
ab
ou
t
ex
am
in
at
io
n
of
ey
e
p
re
ss
u
re
(i
f
th
is
ex
am
in
at
io
n
is
n
ec
es
sa
ry
)
9
5
7
4
6,
08
82
7
7
4
0
8
4
30
9
30
9
51
8
3
W
ai
ti
n
g
ti
m
e
fo
r
a
g
la
u
co
m
a
ou
tp
at
ie
n
t
v
is
it
is
h
al
f
an
h
ou
r
m
ax
im
al
ly
7
5
5
0
1,
45
45
7
5
0
0
7
9
26
2
26
2
19
5
4
P
at
ie
n
ts
fr
om
ou
ts
id
e
th
e
re
g
io
n
g
o
b
ac
k
to
th
ei
r
ow
n
op
h
th
al
m
ol
og
is
t
if
d
ee
m
ed
p
os
si
b
le
8
0
6
2
27
,2
3
7.
35
1
6
2
0
6
2
0
0
7.
35
1
5
M
ed
ic
al
p
at
ie
n
t
re
co
rd
is
av
ai
la
b
le
at
th
e
ou
tp
at
ie
n
t
v
is
it
9
0
7
7
17
,3
6
14
.2
16
7
7
0
9
0
7.
72
5
7.
72
6
6.
49
0
P
a
ti
en
t
or
ie
n
te
d
6
P
at
ie
n
ts
g
et
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
t
v
ie
w
in
g
,
b
u
y
in
g
or
h
ir
in
g
a
C
D
-R
O
M
ab
ou
t
g
la
u
co
m
a
8
0
1
5
0,
53
2.
17
4
1
5
0
1
0
0
2.
17
4
2.
17
4
0
7
P
at
ie
n
ts
g
et
or
al
an
d
w
ri
tt
en
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
at
th
e
cl
in
ic
d
ep
ar
tm
en
t
ab
ou
t
su
rg
er
y
an
d
af
te
rc
ar
e
9
0
6
9
2,
83
19
5
6
9
0
8
1
74
74
12
1
8
P
at
ie
n
ts
g
et
ac
tu
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
t
le
n
g
th
of
an
y
d
el
ay
s
at
th
e
ou
tp
at
ie
n
t
d
ep
ar
tm
en
t
9
0
7
1
0,
12
14
1
7
1
0
7
1
0
0
14
1
9
P
at
ie
n
ts
ar
e
at
fi
rs
t
p
os
to
p
er
at
iv
e
se
en
b
y
th
ei
r
ow
n
su
rg
eo
n
.
8
5
7
5
18
,1
59
7
7
5
0
8
3
19
8
19
8
39
9
10
P
at
ie
n
ts
g
et
su
rg
er
y
b
y
th
e
su
rg
eo
n
th
ey
sa
w
ea
rl
ie
r
at
ou
tp
at
ie
n
t
d
ep
ar
tm
en
t
6
5
5
4
18
,4
4
66
4
5
4
0
8
9
50
4
50
4
16
0
11
P
at
ie
n
ts
ca
n
m
ak
e
a
co
m
b
in
ed
v
is
it
at
th
e
p
er
im
et
ry
an
d
ou
tp
at
ie
n
t
d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
7
0
5
8
7,
11
2.
25
4
5
8
0
7
3
81
0
81
0
1.
44
4
4
0
.7
3
9
1
.6
9
5
1
3
.3
6
4
1
5
.0
5
9
2
5
.6
8
0
N
o
te
s:
C
N
=
n
¼
co
st
s
of
n
on
-c
om
p
li
an
ce
p
er
ti
m
e;
C
N
¼
co
st
s
of
n
on
-c
om
p
li
an
ce
;R
C
S
ðt
¼
1Þ
¼
re
al
is
ed
co
st
sa
v
in
g
s
at
t
¼
1;
R
C
S
ðt
¼
2Þ
¼
re
al
is
ed
co
st
sa
v
in
g
s
at
t
¼
2;
R
C
S
ðt
¼
1
þ
2Þ
¼
to
ta
l
re
al
is
ed
co
st
sa
v
in
g
s;
P
C
S
¼
p
ot
en
ti
al
co
st
sa
v
in
g
s
at
t
¼
2
Table II.
Quality indicators, costs
of non-compliance and
realised and potential
cost savings: results in
2001, 2002 and 2006
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evidence and opinions of an multidisciplinary expert group composed of specialists
and employees of the case study hospital.
Situation at t ¼ 0 (2001). For each indicator, a normative score was determined. For
example, the multidisciplinary group agreed that target pressure (TP) should be
registered in the patient medical record for at least 70 per cent of all glaucoma patients.
Observing a TP is considered to be important in glaucoma management. Writing it
down precludes that it will be predetermined at each additional follow-up visit, thereby
saving time and, therefore, costs.
After finishing the set of quality indicators and normative scores in 2001, a t ¼ 0
measurement was performed. A total of 73 random selected medical records were
analyzed for the notation of the TP. For 37 cases (51 per cent) TP was not noted in the
medical record. Based on these results, the costs were calculated and an analysis of costs
of non-compliance was made (see Table II). The costs of non-compliance for delivering
higher care quality results at the 11 indicators are calculated at more than e40,000.
Results at t ¼ –1 (2002). In 2002, the first results showed that the outcome of the
different indicators had not significantly changed. To count the costs of
non-compliance, the price level of 2001 was used. The notation of the TP (indicator
1) had improved a little and gave a small reduction in costs of non-compliance (e1,695).
In the multidisciplinary team, the importance of this indicator was stressed. Referring
patients back to their own ophthalmologist outside the local region (4) was not
achieved. Most patients were highly satisfied about the case hospital and the glaucoma
ophthalmologists had few means to really refer them back. Moreover, the free choice of
a care provider was generally considered to be important for each patient.
Results at t ¼ 2 (2006). Five years after t ¼ 0, a second measurement was done to
analyze the results and to compare them to the normative scores. The TP was more
often registered (indicator 1) compared to t ¼ 0, but had worsened in comparison to
t ¼ 1. No significant changes are determined in referring patients back to their own
opthalmologists (4) and the delivery of actual information about delay time at the
outpatient department (8).
With respect to the indicators “maximum waiting time of 0.5 hour” (3), “surgeon
should be the outpatient physician” (10), “combination appointment outpatient and
perimetry department” (11) the norms were reached. Overall, the improvement on these
indicators gave a reduction of costs of non-compliance of e13,364 after four years.
The availability of the patient medical record (5) was improved and met the
standard in 2006, but the multidisciplinary group stressed the importance of reaching a
100 per cent score on this indicator. The dissemination of information by flyers about
the examination of eye pressure (2) and about surgery and its aftercare (7) were also
improved over time, but do not meet the predetermined standards, just like the
indicator “first outpatient visit after post surgical control by the own surgeon” (9).
Expressed in the QCM the hospital realised a reduction in costs of non-compliance of
e15,059 between 2001 and 2006. With respect to the projections of 2000, approximately
37 per cent was realised. Just a small part (approximately 4 per cent) was obtained in the
first year after the introduction and the definition of the quality indicators.
CDVC
When QCM was developed, issues such as quality costs and the reduction of cost of
non-compliance played an important role in the business-economic views on health
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care (Morse, 1991; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993; Walburg, 2003). In more recent views
and experiences in industry, one may see an approach towards (added) “value”. Porter
and Teisberg (2006) drew attention to the contribution of different activities in care
processes in obtaining and increasing patient value. They developed the CDVC.
Contrary to a demand-based healthcare system, Porter and Teisberg’s value-oriented
approach focussed on integrated treatment and service, available over time for the
different medical conditions. In their views, each description of the care process has
some fixed steps of different activities over time. Porter and Teisberg distinguish:
monitoring/preventing, diagnosing, preparing, intervening and monitoring/managing.
Although hospitals place both the recovering and the monitoring stage mostly outside
of the care process, they are each important in obtaining patient value. In glaucoma
care, most of the patients are in these stages a long time.
According to the CDVC model, three assessment criteria play an important role in
creating patient value:
(1) Assessing. Patient access to care in the different parts of the process.
(2) Measuring. The ways of gaining information about medical aspects of the
patient, during the care process, medical information is gathered repeatedly.
(3) Informing. Attention, instructions and coaching of the patient.
We transferred the 11 selected glaucoma quality indicators used in the QCM into the
model of CDVC. As seen in Figure 5, the indicators cover almost the whole process and
areas of assessing, measuring and informing.
The row of “measuring” was covered with few QCM quality indicators and these
were partially effective in reducing costs. The process steps of “diagnosing” and
“monitoring/managing” were covered by more QCM quality indicators and also
showed a reduction of costs of non-compliance. By contrast, the columns “preparing”
and “intervening” parts in the process were covered less for “assessing”, “measuring”,
and “informing”. The CDVC intends to show that total patient value consists of value
activities and “margin”. Value in health care is defined as the health outcome per dollar
of cost expended. Margin is defined as “the difference between total value and the
collective costs of realising value activities” (Porter and Teisberg, 2006). This collective
perspective differs to the quality costing perspective of one single hospital. Benefits
could be made in the part of the chain outside the hospital, while costs are made in de
hospital.
RQ3: reimbursement and hospital management on quality and costs
Reimbursement not (yet) based on product-based quality results. A fixed reimbursement
budget for hospitals and physicians (budget fee) still exists for most of the Dutch
health care delivery (Aas, 1995; NZA, 2007). Since 2005 selected DBC’s, approximately
10 per cent of the total care delivery in The Netherlands (for example cataract care), is
financed by agreed prices and volumes between hospitals and insurance companies.
Unlike cataract care, glaucoma is still part of the fixed budget and as a DBC not subject
to negotiations with a health insurance company. Internal calculations of the hospital
show that the actual reimbursement for glaucoma care within the fixed budget is about
e300. This is far below the actual costs as calculated by the hospital of approximately
e1,800. This number is close to estimations of what the price would be for glaucoma if
they were negotiated between hospitals and health insurance companies (Ministry of
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Figure 5.
Care delivery value chain
for glaucoma
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VWS, 2007; NZA, 2007). In the USA glaucoma surgery costs $2,270 (PBA, 2007). The
current deficit on glaucoma care in the eye hospitals is internally covered through the
profits made with cataract surgery. This way of substitution is common in a budget
system, but is not in line with the policy aim to have market conform prices of specific
care processes and their products. Zuurbier and Steinbusch (2006) have shown that
relationships and transition tools between old and new systems for Dutch hospitals are
necessary if hospitals want to maintain their current financial position.
Task substitution in the glaucoma shared care unit was (among other things) possible,
because the health insurance companies fully reimbursed the visits by allied health
professionals as if they had been executed by ophthalmologist themselves. Although the
reimbursement did not cover the costs, the task substitution did not increase the loss per
treatment (see also Williams and Cookson, 2006). As long as reimbursement of health care
is not related to the activities involved in treating a patient, and the outcome of a
treatment and prices are not freely negotiable, the reimbursement system is not
proportionate. Delivering quality care and realising more demand gives just more loss in a
system with already loss per treatment. In the current budget system for glaucoma care,
quality improvement based on outcomes is more oppressed than stimulated.
No financial incentives for glaucoma ophthalmologists. The fee budget for physicians
in which the financial returns depends on the adapted model of allocation between the
partners. Allocation based on working hours, instead of piece-wages and quality of
care does not give an added incentive. With local agreements on the reimbursements
and quality of glaucoma care, ophthalmologists may benefit from increasing both the
quantity and the quality of care.
No multidisciplinary glaucoma team with responsible process owner. During the last
years, the treatment processes were more centralised in the internal business and
organisational structure of the case hospital. Establishing a single head per treatment
team in 2006 led to a more obvious hierarchy. One person now became responsible for
the performance of the entire team. However, there was no multidisciplinary glaucoma
team (with its own policy, planned meetings, etc). Managing and dividing of the budget
among teams and departments is still based on standard parameters and costs of
non-compliance are not shown and used for making budget decisions on a structural
bases. Based on the theory “quality is free” (Crosby, 1983), the strategic top of the
hospital tries to achieve improvements without more personnel or investments.
Discussion
Glaucoma care process redesign and development
The case hospital had a strategic motivation for using the QCM. Because of a national
Dutch policy 15 years ago, single medical speciality hospitals had to close or merge
(“big is beautiful”). The case hospital chose to stand out as a “centre of excellence” to
avoid such a merger. Its quality had to be a distinguishing parameter, and the quality
cost theory was seen as a driving force.
Use of quality cost models for specific treatment processes needs unequivocal
steering of those processes (Custers et al., 2004). In 2000, a QCM for glaucoma was
introduced although without glaucoma care being organised as a separate product line
with one person being responsible for the overall management of the quality and costs
outcomes. Looking back, more successful use of QCM probably could have occurred
with one assigned executive per treatment team (see also Walburg, 2003).
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QCM requires a certain degree of knowledge on the various cost elements that are
linked to activities and potential revenue losses and information on the quality of care.
In addition, the combination of quality and cost outcomes does not primarily interest
physicians, nurses and other personnel as long as there are no direct financial
consequences for functions and departments. Therefore, QCM should be used both top
down and bottom up.
Developments in quality and costs are related to the CDVC theory of Porter and
Teisberg (2006). We have tried to use this model as a framework for thinking in “value”
by putting quality and cost results from QCM into CDVC. To really use and calculate
“patient value” (in terms of health results per unit of cost), however, the meaning of
“value” should be further operationalised. Comparing the QCM and the CDVC, value
could be interpreted as a decrease of costs of non-compliance. Effects of added value
and reduction of costs of non-compliance on care delivery processes are, however,
different. Profit and loss account is similarly influenced by the growth of earnings and
cost reduction. In the present Dutch health care system added value for patients differs
from reduction of internal costs of non-compliance for the hospital. In contrast, the
external costs of non-compliance (arising after hospital care delivery to a patient, due to
non-conformities or defects at any stage of the care delivery) are more related to the
total patient value and the cost for the whole society. CDVC forces to think in processes
and gives attention to the different parts of the process, but more clues and wider
operationalisation is necessary for the final purpose: fix and quantification of “patient
value”. In this respect the theory by Porter and Teisberg as presented in their book
stays rather generic and vague as to how to calculate patient value.
To realise successful competition on results for care providers, determination of this
value is important. Increase of earnings and decrease of costs has the same effects on
gain. In the current Dutch health care system, patient value differs from a reduction in
costs of non-compliance of the provider. Any reduction of direct costs has no added
value to the patient. To a hospital organisation however, financial outcomes are
important parameters.
Value based competition: principles and practice
The question for care providers in general and the case hospital in particular is: how
useful is a CDVC in cooperating with actual care delivery and preparing for new
provider roles in the upcoming decade? Comparing the principles for value-based
competition used by Porter and Teisberg (2006) (see introduction) to day-to-day
glaucoma care in the Netherlands, it seems to be the principles are (and could) used
partly.
According to the first principle of CDVC, one should focus on value for patients, not
just on lowering costs. Using the QCM will help organisations increasing the value for
patients and at the same time create value for the organisation in terms of reducing
costs and retaining and attracting more patients or high qualified staff. The notion of
“value” however is not sufficiently operationalised. To measure value in “health results
per unit of costs”, detailed information about the outcome of care and costs are
necessary. Hospitals should thus be asked to generate this type of output information.
Successively to that, competition based on results could be realised if concrete outcome
results are shown.
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Second, the principle that high quality care could be less costly was the reason for
using quality cost theory in the case study. The results of the QCM showed an
improvement for patient and professional and a reduction of costs of non-compliance.
In the next principles, Porter and Teisberg (2006) stress that competition should
centre on medical conditions over the full chain of care and competition should be
regional and national, not just local. This chain approach plays a central role in the
strategy of the case hospital in building an “eye care network” with optometrists,
general practitioners and general hospitals. Building this kind of chains and creating
matching chain outcome indicators, seems to be important in really meeting patients’
needs all over the care chain. To measure added value over the total chain, it is
necessary for providers to create cooperation between different (types of) organisations
in care delivery.
Also the principle stating that value must be driven by provider experience, scale
and learning at the medical condition level seems to play an important role in the case
hospital. A hospital that focuses on selected treatments has much expertise on specific
items, could treat large numbers of patients and have education for specialised
physicians and other personnel. Integrated effects of experience, span of control and
education can contribute to the creation of value. Porter and Teisberg (2006) draw in
relation to this principle a virtual cycle, which relates large numbers of patients, rapid
innovations and improvement of results.
In conclusion, in this case study we show that QCM and CDVC can be useful tools
for hospital management to manage both on quality and cost outcomes in glaucoma
care. Within the CDVC approach, QCM can be used to facilitate the choice between
quality projects and provide focus on the potential reduction in costs of
non-compliance. Over a period of five years, the studied care process has been better
organisationally embedded, only as a reaction to competitive forces, and QCM has been
applied successfully although with marginal financial gains. To reach agreement
among the various stakeholders on what constitutes patient value could be a first step.
The external validity of this single case study is increased by the fact that the context
variables are not only relevant for the glaucoma care delivery, but also applicable for
other care pathways. Although the theory of CDVC sounds nice, to realise it in practice
is highly dependent on not only reengineering internal organisational processes and
developing the necessary measurement tools on quality and costs but also on the
existing external reimbursement system. Long-term value is surely not a quick win.
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